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abstract 
The rise of the Emerging Market is a remarkable exemplar of an idea that originated and 
was socialized in Western financial markets during the 1980s. It has since gained rapid, 
wider normative status with respect to a particular set of beliefs that motivate policy choices 
on macroeconomic management, economic development and financial sector reforms in 
developing and less developed countries. I draw on the Polanyian notion of 
commodification and recent extensions to his scholarship in the realm of ideas that seek 
to explicate processes through which the dominant ideal of the self-regulating market is 
justified as fundamental to the organization of society. Against the backdrop of globally 
mobile capital, I critique the prevalence of a particular ideology of emergence in which 
commodified geography and commodified finance interact to shape policy. In this process, 
evaluative talk plays a key role in legitimizing the expectations of global capital and 
overcoming inherent contradictions through the rhetoric of non-crises. I thus highlight the 
ascendance of a narrow and instrumentally economic understanding of emergence in 
contemporary, post reform India as is asserted in conventional policy discourse. I conclude 
by remarking on the significant constriction of ideational space for the consideration of 
alternative, historically informed approaches to social and economic development. The 
legacy of Karl Polanyi serves as a prophetic reminder for the consequences of such 
constriction. 
[Initially]…There was no foreign portfolio investment in emerging markets. In fact, 
the name was designed to give a more uplifting feeling to what we had originally 
called the third world fund.  
Former Deputy Director, The International Finance Corporation (IFC) 
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Introduction 
Karl Polanyi (1944-2001) attributed the early nineteenth century rise of market 
society and its integrative economic logic based on the institution of the self-
regulating market to the conjunctive rise of a universal economic motive (personal 
gain) and the fictitious commodification of land, labour and money. It is arguable 
whether Polanyi could have foreseen the extent of fictitious commodification in 
contemporary market society, in particular the commodification of entire 
geographies. Kaur (2012) emphasizes the ascendancy of the superficial project of 
corporatized nation branding over development-tethered nation building in the 
competitive race to emerge as the desired destination for global capital. Against the 
backdrop of nation states increasingly seeing themselves primarily as managers of 
capital, she identifies: 
a defining aspect of neoliberal economic restructuring over the past few decades has 
been the re-making of the nation-form in the image of the corporation — 
Nationality, Inc — complete with its own trademark and a brand image. The shift 
marks the move from the ideas and practices of nation building to those of nation 
branding, which is often suggested as the attainment of a higher and more complete 
form of nationhood appropriate to the era of globalization. (2012: 605-606) 
Notions of emerging, emergence and emerging markets are central to this exercise of 
competitive nationalized brand building (Kaur and Hansen, 2016: 269), 
particularly in the international market for finance. The term emerging market 
represents an idea that originated in the IFC (a leading World Bank member 
financial institution focused on private sector initiatives in developing economies) 
over three decades ago to elevate a potential but fledgling asset class (investment 
category comprising securities with similar characteristics) to a new standard 
worthy of attention from international banks, fund managers and capital 
providers. Emergence now transcends economic, political and public policy spheres 
and is pervasive in the lexicon of economists, academics, analysts, businessmen, 
executives, fund managers as well as the print and electronic media in India today. 
The notion of an emerging India interacts deeply with collective construction of 
national identity. In particular, the idea of emergence increasingly demands 
adherence to a set of standardized expectations in the domains of macroeconomic 
policy, financial markets and indeed, the political economy, as repeatedly 
articulated and enforced by key internal and external actors.  
Such expectations are usually enacted through evaluative talk that define red lines 
of acceptable behavior. In so doing they seek to establish norms that de-legitimize 
alternate notions of development (including the vehement rejection of the policies 
of a previous generation) that cannot be accommodated by the immediate needs 
of globally mobile capital. In the process of establishing such norms through the 
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reproduction and enforcement of evaluative talk, India’s emergence corresponds to 
the Polanyian description of a growing, acquisitive and inherently contradictory 
market society. The outcome is a remarkably rapid transformation of a civilization 
into an appendage to the self-regulating market, on course towards the ‘running 
of society as an adjunct to the market’ (Polanyi, 1944/2001: 60). 
The great transformation 
Particularly in the last three decades, Karl Polanyi’s classic oeuvre, The Great 
transformation, 1944 has been the subject of analysis and interpretation across the 
disciplines of economic sociology, economic anthropology, historical sociology 
and critical political economy. Institutional theories of change describe Polanyi’s 
work as a remarkable example of macro-social analysis based on the use of ‘history 
as an analytical tool’, consider Polanyi as one of the founding fathers of classical 
historical institutionalism (Steinmo, 2008: 122) and acknowledge him as one of 
the original contributors to the institutionalist approach of the study of political 
economy alongside Thorstein Veblen and Max Weber (Dunlavy, 1998: 114; 
Steinmo and Thelen, 1998: 3). Economic and historical sociologists and political 
historians have been at the forefront in debating, theoretically extending and 
empirically examining Polanyian constructs and methods (Block, 1979, 2001, 
2003; Block and Somers 2005, 2014; Dale 2010; Gemici, 2008; Hann and Hart, 
2009). 
Recent scholarship on Polanyi has sought to re-interpret his profound yet 
somewhat ambiguous ideas in a neoliberal context. Intellectual epitaphs to 
Polanyian thought arising from his wrong interpretation of history and 
emphasizing the historical persistence of market societies in mankind’s 
deterministic evolution towards the modern market economy have also been 
attempted (Hejeebu and McCloskey, 2004: 137). Others have sought to 
problematize the apparent challenge to Polanyian thought presented by the 
mutating yet persistent nature of capitalism in seeking re-interpretations that can 
lead to ‘progressive possibilities’ (Dale, 2010: 208; Watson, 2014: 622). Amidst 
repeated crises, Polanyi’s ideas on the socially disintegrative consequences of the 
fictitious commodification of land, labour and money in an industrial society, that 
subjects its social sphere to the dominance of free markets and, the reactionary 
processes of the double movement, command renewed attention. The ‘ghost of 
Karl Polanyi’ (Levitt, 2013:1) continues to stalk debates beyond the confines of the 
World Economic Forum.  
Polanyi challenges the ahistorical presumption pervasive in significant sections of 
mainstream modern economic (and indeed, social) thought that contemporary 
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arrangements and methods of organization are advancements of timeless 
practices. Polanyi’s ontological commitment to a holistic view of man, and his 
temporal critique of industrialized Western society is therefore, appropriately 
suited to a contemporary study of eastern societies such as India, where, arguably, 
for most of the twentieth century, the independent sphere of the market economy 
did not dominate human society. Polanyi’s analysis refutes economic determinism 
that tends to relegate social motives to irrelevance by presuming that all changes 
in society are driven by the economic sphere. He also represents a direct challenge 
to micro or reductionist theories of institutional change that place economic 
rationality over all other forms of rationality and theorize institutions, uncritically, 
as the consequence of innovations by powerful actors driven by rational self-
interest. 
Market fundamentalism and ideational processes 
The notion of market fundamentalism in contemporary Polanyian scholarship owes 
its substantive origin through Soros (1998) to Polanyi. Polanyi’s thesis of the rise 
of the market economy predicated on the commodification of man, nature and 
money, the resultant transition of society into a market society and the central role 
of ‘values, motives and policy’ (Polanyi, 1957: 250) in the institution of economic 
processes in society, prefigure the rise of market fundamentalism in a market 
society. Block and Somers re-define and deploy this notion in a somewhat 
deprecatory manner to highlight ‘the quasi-religious certainty expressed by 
contemporary advocates of market self-regulation’ (2014: 3) and inductively 
theorize within a framework of ideas and narratives that synthesizes ideational 
processes of institutional change with Polanyi’s account of the rise of the self-
regulating market (2005, 2014). They extend Polanyi’s conception of 
embeddedness in a market society, i.e. the arrangement of institutions of the 
market vis-a-vis social institutions, to the ideational sphere. Accordingly, Block and 
Somers argue that the notion of market fundamentalism constitutes ‘ideas, public 
narratives and explanatory systems by which states, societies, and political cultures 
construct, transform, explain, and normalize market processes’ (2014: 155). Their 
work represents a singularly significant and operationalizable extension of 
Polanyian theory in the domain of ideas, with implications for contexts such as 
India.  
Just as markets are embedded differently at a functional or structural level within 
market societies, i.e. the separation of political and economic institutions is 
configured differently in market societies over time and space through regulations 
and institutional arrangements, markets are also embedded and re-embedded 
differently at an ideational level. A key, inductively derived assumption on which 
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ideational embeddedness is based is the following: ideas exercise an independent 
role in catalysing institutional change in certain contexts. Once this assumption is 
accepted, Block and Somers posit that ‘many battles over social and economic 
policy should be redefined as conflicts not over whether markets should be 
embedded but rather which ideational regime will do the embedding’ (ibid.: 155).  
Thus, ideas are contested within ideational regimes and, regime changes in a given 
society are rare. Ideas that are in tune with the given regime are epistemically 
privileged. The broader regime prevalent in the contemporary global context is one 
of historically persistent market fundamentalism. Block and Somers (2014: 166-173) 
attribute its ascendance and persistence since nineteenth century Western society 
to three underlying principles. The first is social naturalism - the claim that the 
laws of nature govern society and that the laws of the market represent the natural 
order of things. The second is theoretical realism constituting apparently inductive 
but substantively deductive causal claims that argue from observable effects to the 
true unobserved reality, e.g. that unemployment and low wages are invariably 
observed in a welfare society not despite welfare support but because of welfare 
support. The third principle is that of the conversion narrative, i.e. conversion of 
actors or groups from one ideational regime to another through the neutralization 
of the prevailing narrative and the depiction of an alternate story by moving back 
and forth between ‘a more harmonious past before the onset of the crisis’ and 
‘forward again to the problematic present’ (ibid.: 172). The operationalization of 
the current regime is sustained through processes that seize crisis opportunities 
by seeking to problematize the crisis, argue counterfactually so as to delegitimize 
the original intellectual sponsors as architects of the current crisis and seek to alter 
the narrative by promising a utopian alternative for the future through a powerful 
counter-narrative. Thus market fundamentalism: 
simply imposes a different kind of embeddedness from that of institutional 
pragmatism, (social protection) one that tells a different story about the urgency of 
liberating markets form the tyranny of policies that violate the autonomy of self-
regulating natural entities. (2014: 184) 
Consequently, market fundamentalism provides a crucial entry point through which 
a number of Polanyian constructs can be operationalized in the analysis of 
narratives relating to prevailing ideas and institutions, without necessarily 
subscribing to deterministic outcomes. Specifically, I draw upon the interplay 
between commodified geography, commodified money (global finance) and the 
notion of market fundamentalism in problematizing the dominant ideological and 
policy proclivities in emerging India. 
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Commoditized space, notions of emergence and global capital 
The metaphors deployed to describe emerging economies in geographically 
prefixed predatory or behemoth-like terms explicit in image conjuring exercises in 
the global economic discourse, and particularly, the financial media such as Asian 
tigers, African lions, the dragon, the elephant etc. serve dual purposes. They capture 
and perpetuate the intensely competitive nature of international capital 
mobilization in the new pecking order of emergent nation states engaged in the 
race to outperform within the asset class of emerging markets, reminiscent of the 
analogous race for survival in the wilderness. Further, they provide lubrication to 
the public aspirations amongst the vanguard of emergent nations — to emerge 
victorious in this race. The components of this asset class however are not 
homogenously constituted. Sidaway (2012: 57) provides an interesting description 
in terms of the spatial dimension of emergence through his description of re-
converged enclaves as demarcated zones of development within ‘the third world’ 
that represent sites of fulfilment and function as nodal representatives of the 
globalized world but are ‘partially dis-embedded’ (perhaps, even starkly so) from 
their immediate context. 
However, there is an additional temporal dimension to this emergence, which 
manifests itself in the belief patterns and notions of the emergent nation. These 
arise from qualitative connotations associated with emergence and are anchored 
in an impression of purposive motion — from the past (undesirable, servile) to the 
future (developed, assertive, aggressive). Such an understanding seeks to foreclose 
consideration of options since the materialization of any schisms, however deep, 
are non-controversially attributed to temporary aberrations encountered in the 
progress towards a promised, powerful and redeeming future. Such aberrations 
are often perceived as opportunities to incrementally correct technical flaws in 
policy instead of substantively challenging direction. Emergence, thus 
comprehended, is associated with a set of fiercely guarded emotions and beliefs 
appropriated by the elite, enlightened citizenry of the emergent. Particularly in the 
case of India, these often include a feeling of purposeful redemption, a belief in a 
vague yet shared perception of a relentless pursuit of the economic summit and a 
qualification earned by virtue of an unwavering focus on coaxing digits of growth 
out of the economy. A demonstrated commitment to global economic integration 
that entitles, indeed commands greater attention to a performing India from the 
audience of national and international spectators becomes imperative as emergence 
increasingly constitutes a tenuous perquisite representing privileged membership 
in a global club of the like-minded. Such recognition however is contingent upon 
India’s continued inclusion in prestigious financial groupings and indices so as to 
justify a persistent premium in investment valuation.  
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Consequently, in the domain of economic policy, advocacy of an emerging India 
requires the establishment of an institutional environment that is able to 
simultaneously accommodate incompatible components. In particular, these 
include the enduring facilitation of powerful private innovators who are able to 
contract at minimal transaction cost and continually undertake institutional 
innovation in the prospect of private gain. Additionally, a stable polity is sought, 
that sees itself primarily as a service provider in the assurance of continuity as a 
legislator of low cost contract enforcement and non-interference. Such a polity is 
expected to commit itself to an efficient property rights system so that incentives 
for frictions arising from subjective perceptions rooted in alternative logics 
(tradition, custom and local belief) are minimized. Further, a judiciary geared to 
unambiguous and speedy resolution of disputes in its primary role as low cost 
third party enforcer and, an amenable citizenry who cultivate necessary opinions 
are desired, so that a stable institutional environment can be maintained to 
facilitate the operation of other institutional components. These expectations by 
the orthodoxy as the essential template for institutional design and change for 
emerging India re-centre our attention on Polanyi’s notion of the ‘economistic 
fallacy’ (Polanyi, 1953:1). Fundamental to Polanyi’s conception of the economy as 
an instituted process are his accompanying emphatic injunctions to avoid equating 
the economy with the market in its purely formal, economistic sense instead of its 
human counterpart (a presumptive encumbrance of our zeitgeist) thereby 
ignoring the place of economy in society. The economistic advocacy of the 
orthodoxy however is beholden to haute finance. 
In the globally interconnected financial economy, commoditized money has a 
special role to play in the commodification of geography i.e. branded emergence, by 
interacting with domestic notions of emergence and therefore, enforcing 
emergence from without. Lee (2003: 62) highlights the devaluation and 
consequent destabilization of locationally fixed capital through spatial mobility of 
financial capital across geographies and investments in compressed time, 
originating from the process of continuous, comparative evaluations predicated on 
increasingly fragile (and often oscillating) financial knowledge. When applied 
instantaneously over a range of time horizons (investment holding period 
considerations), such knowledge amplifies the liquidity, scale and power of 
financial markets and facilitates the construction of geographically uneven 
development. The very threat of (re)switching of financial capital consequent on 
such mobility exerts policy pressure on emergent states that is reflective of: 
the geographical imaginations and experience of those working within financial 
markets and the interactive construction and exchange of knowledge – often over 
very short time frames – in which they are constantly engaged. (Lee, 2003: 63) 
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The continuous flow of information through broker networks, content providers 
and financial media creates perceived and actual instantaneous arbitrage 
opportunities across geographies or investments (asset classes), serving as 
stimulus for the continual readjustment of views, consummation of value 
realization and movement of financial capital to the next transitory destination in 
order to unlock value. The notion that such attributes of mobility and instantaneous 
re-pricing of risk on a global scale are essential for a perennial, universal reflection 
of underlying assets at their fair value appears clearly antithetical to another 
mainstream economic assertion (World Bank Report, 2010) that productive 
investment requires a stable regime, reliable institutions and a predictable 
business environment. Underlining this dialectical opposition is the fact that 
globally mobile financial capital constantly juxtaposes the value of real investment 
against its fluid, market determined price, fueling volatility, affecting sentiments 
and thereby adversely influencing real investment and business decisions. Lee 
(2003) highlights this antithesis in the context of global risk aversion and a flight 
to quality, resulting in reduced portfolio investment in emerging markets, pro-
cyclicality of capital flows and a consequential penalty that emerging markets bear 
for global growth slowdown. 
Inherent contradictions of self-regulating finance 
Pro-cyclicality of capital flows, especially in the form of foreign portfolio 
investment (into domestic equity and bond markets of emergent states such as 
India) presents a deepening persistent challenge to one of the fundamental 
postulates in finance. The sub-discipline of portfolio theory within modern 
international finance espouses asset class diversification as a means of countering 
cross-asset class return correlation especially in the face of recurrent and 
prolonged contagion in financial markets, often in anticipation of such events. 
This assumes significance in the post Global Financial Crisis (GFC) regime. In its 
simplest form the exercise involves (re)switching financial capital amongst 
combinations of investable assets that bear low positive to zero correlation, for 
example, cash and equity. At a more sophisticated level, it involves evaluating 
combinations of assets (including geographies) that at the margin yield superior 
positive nominal risk adjusted returns per unit of volatility at the level of the 
portfolio. Recent trends on the effectiveness of global portfolio diversification 
strategies, especially in equity and bond markets around and after the GFC are 
instructive.  
The process of establishing new destinations for financial capital through the 
creation and re-categorization of emerging and frontier territories aids the widening 
of portfolio opportunities through the emergence of alternate investable asset 
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classes (geographies) that appear initially heterogeneous. However, increasing 
policy isomorphism over time is manifested through shared attributes such as 
dependence on unpredictable global capital to mobilize foreign currency reserves 
and finance real sector growth and, rising inter-connection with global financial 
markets. This diminishes portfolio diversification benefits, especially over the 
short to medium term arising from higher financial asset return and volatility 
correlation between emerging markets and the US (safe haven) during peak 
contagion (e.g. GFC), rising co-movement of returns during bull markets since 
GFC and significantly greater interdependence of bond returns in emerging 
markets (Bianconi et al., 2013; Dimitriou et al., 2013; Syriopoulos et al., 2015). 
Recent calls for replacing asset class diversification with (often) ambiguously 
interpreted risk factor based diversification (Ilmanen and Kizer, 2012) require 
dynamic portfolio management and entail high transaction costs. Frequent regime 
shifts affect underlying risk factors and further mandate taking on leverage in the 
portfolio of an order that effectively exposes the portfolio to a different form of risk.  
Ironically, in every instance of an (imported) crisis, emergent states like India are 
constrained to implement policy measures designed to speedily attract and retain 
foreign exchange reserves by incentivizing global capital inflow in its most 
transient form — foreign portfolio investment. Thus, we observe two pairs of 
incongruous dynamics. One pertains to the emerging contradictions within 
portfolio management techniques affecting portfolio investors of foreign capital 
and, the other to rising dependability on tenuous foreign currency flows while 
seeking to guard exchange rate stability and also financing growth. These 
represent classic Polanyian illustrations of the internal contradictions arising from 
the sophisticated reproduction of commoditized self-regulating finance in the 
global market that emerging countries such as India face. 
There is a further dimension, however, to this perennially imminent threat of 
capital switching that Lee (2003) addresses partially. Indeed, the mere spectre of a 
large scale switching away of financial capital exercises a regulatory impact on local 
behaviour and norms, thereby ensuring conformity with global expectations and 
limiting discretion in policy and action at the level of the emergent sovereign. Not 
only must the emergent be compliant but must also be seen to be compliant at all 
times implying that any change in perceptions about intent is reason enough for 
the reconstruction of financial knowledge. This has profound implications. Every 
potential announcement and action by the sovereign must be carefully analyzed ex-
ante and provision made for compensating factors so that cross spatial and inter-
temporal expectations from global capital are adequately factored into policy 
decisions. Dissenting influential voices or opinions in policy corridors must be 
ignored or quelled lest financial markets catch on to the whiff of indiscipline and 
read rebellion from it. When such balancing is no longer possible, damage control 
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emerges as the last resort. Policies, thus lose connect with the developmental 
dimension of stated ideology and are increasingly hostage to the immediate verdict 
of financial markets. 
Evaluative talk  
The process of capital switching does not occur passively but is accompanied and 
often determined by a strong sub-text of ‘evaluative talk’ (Lee, 2003: 67). Evaluative 
talk aims to continuously (re)create conditions appropriate for (re)switching 
through the discursive constitution of fitness for investment purpose. Such 
evaluative talk in the context of emerging markets is often comparative, 
juxtaposing nation states as lead-lag players so as to project them as examples of 
successes or failures on neoliberal parameters of economic reform. This is often 
accomplished by establishing expectations of reform implementation (in the 
public domain) from the elected head of the sovereign emergent in the process. 
Kaur (2012: 605) highlights the reversal from the earlier situation of ‘the 
corporation seeking patronage as purveyor to the sovereign’ to the prevailing 
regime where the state acts as purveyor to global capital through the display of 
abundant ‘raw material, cheap skilled labour and unfettered access to markets’. It 
is no surprise, therefore, that the prospective customer is constantly evaluating the 
vendor’s wares and publicly setting terms for their merchantability. 
Based on analysis of prevailing discourses (popular and financial), I posit that 
evaluative talk, especially in the context of emerging markets, constitute three 
broad, cognate categories. These include value-laden exhortations for speedy 
implementation of neoliberal reforms while making exhortative, critical 
comparisons over time and space in order to highlight missed opportunities or to 
avoid being perceived as a laggard. Second, warnings of external risks (positive and 
negative) for example ‘Fed tapering’, Eurozone crisis and oil price movements, 
thereby highlighting needs for resiliency and continued reform commitment 
constitute another category. Finally, appeals to seize the opportunity to fulfil 
potential and attain one’s destined place in the world order constitute the third. 
Evaluative talk typical of these categories can originate from internal or external 
actors and usually converges (across actors and categories) at critical moments 
when a decisive regime shift is imminent or appears possible. As an illustration, 
the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) episodic warnings to ‘emerging’ 
economies like India of looming external risks and emphasis on speedy reform 
implementation as an antidote are typical of diagnostic rhetoric. These are 
premised on the expectation that every new wave of imported crisis accentuated by 
globally mobile capital must be countered by nimble footed policy implementation 
by emerging markets on their onward march to emergence (e.g. IMF, 2016). 
Srivatsan Lakshminarayan Market fundamentalism in the age of ‘haute finance’ 
note | 859 
Highlighting the dialectical nature of the problem, is the irony, that if fulfilled, 
these crisis events would constrain options for India’s monetary policy (interest 
rate reduction), investment reform process (attracting foreign investment inflows) 
and foreign exchange management (stable exchange rate and robust foreign 
exchange reserve maintenance) at precisely the moment of the articulated need to 
implement these measures, thereby diminishing prospects for reform as judged 
by the same neoliberal standards on which these expectations are articulated.  
Evaluative talks by internal actors include allusions to the shameful legacy of India’s 
economic performance prior to the introduction of liberalization and 
commencement of global integration (1991), the externally anchored nature of the 
vision of what India must or must not do – the imperative of measuring up to 
international expectations, the separation of the social sphere from the economic 
and, the articulation of a business case for future financing of the social sector 
contingent upon economic growth. In the context of emergence, evaluative talk 
thus seeks to further the logic of commodified finance in two very distinct and 
related ways. First, it seeks to achieve and sustain the completion of the Polanyian 
triad, namely the commodification of land and labour. Second, in the domain of 
performance accounting, it demands on-going spatial (across emerging markets) 
and temporal (fiscal quarter or year) policy accountability echoing the earlier 
reversal of roles between state and corporation.  
Opportunistic invocation of non-crises in the service of market 
fundamentalism 
How do prescriptions by the prevailing orthodoxy retain credibility against chronic 
and episodic crises of slow-down, recession and jobless growth? I posit that this is 
achieved through the evaluative rhetoric of non-crisis. This involves talking down 
by juxtaposing relative intensities of episodic indigence, emphasizing the 
absoluteness of fundamentals and, the imperative of countering capital flight. Such 
manufacture of crisis reconcilement is often accompanied by a pragmatic, 
naturalistic emphasis on the inevitable incurrence of globally imported costs for 
imminent local development. The discursive construction of concrete visions of 
development through persistent appeals to the power of instrumental imagination 
involves the constant conjuring of material manifestations of progress and the 
consequent shaping of realities that hide the tenuousness of access and ignore the 
problematic domestic reproduction of a colonial past, in the relentless and febrile 
makings of a new free history of a free society. The capture of ideology, vision and 
institutional action by conforming and totalizing imaginations is thus complete.  
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This paves the way for the situational negotiation of morals predicated on the 
economic imperatives of substantively non-economistic contexts that is 
simultaneously pervasive (by its reproduction throughout the hierarchy of society) 
and regressive (by its relentless shaping of individual and collective 
consciousness). The dialectical abasement of wholesome collective histories and 
geographies, their diversities and inherited human-ness, through the verbalized 
elevation of synthetic boundaries formalized in grand narratives of growth is thus 
achieved. Simultaneously, the reinforcement of conformity to the instrumental 
epistemology underlying such narratives through the continual emphasis on the 
precariousness of growth is on display, resulting in the non-reflexive advancement 
of performative growth over its subjective and substantial alternatives. The 
fierceness of calls for safeguards to growth arising from unavoidable imperatives 
to nurture the reified concept persists, in the course of which, the real subjective 
constituent is often, collateral damage. The latent negation of human-ness in the 
pursuit of metricized outcomes eventually, by its reproduction, constitutes a 
conscious abnegation of stated intent. Finally, the anticipatory rhetoric of deep and 
impending crisis, simultaneously serves preparatory and cautionary purposes 
(highlighting the inevitable consequences of failing to fall in line) in the age of 
market fundamentalism.  
Burden of proof 
The over-riding (though not unchallenged) mainstream assertion dominating 
Indian economic policy discourse is the following — not opening markets to 
investment and competition, i.e. not establishing ‘One Big Market’ (Polanyi, 
1944/2001: 75, 187), and the failure to unleash animal spirits, will accelerate the 
decline of India as an emerging super-power and jeopardize development. 
Arguments for a more complete commodification of land and labour prescribe a 
simpler land acquisition process that would overcome the challenges of adequate 
compensation, community consensus and social audit and, a labour market where 
separation is easier. Central to this naturalistic, conversion narrative is a mix of 
unreflective experiences and notions. Dissatisfaction with decades of insular and 
bureaucratic approaches to post-independence economic development acts as a 
powerful motivating force. Further, the collapse of communism is putatively 
interpreted as representing the permanent demise of non-capitalistic and often by 
conflated association, non-libertarian modes of economic and social organization. 
These are accompanied by misplaced juxtaposition of advanced capitalistic 
economic models with those of the former Soviet bloc to highlight the absence of 
viable alternatives and, the conflation of liberal, socialist models with those of 
failed communist models by tarring all alternative models of nation building and 
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development with the same brush. These arguments fail to adequately introspect, 
in several ways.  
First, they over-weight (often unconsciously) a particular phase of Western 
development based on the self-regulating market commencing between the late 
1960s and early 1970s and in particular the globalized neoliberal version 
ascendant since the early 1980s. However, they ignore the period of turbulence 
arising out of unregulated market orientation in the run up to the great depression 
and the period of relatively stable welfare capitalism after the end of the Second 
World War culminating in the early 1970s in which restrictions on international 
finance attenuated the commodification of money (Lacher, 1999: 356). They also 
discount the strong state-led (sometimes at the expense of democratic rights) and 
social infrastructure-intensive nature of development in the case of East Asia, the 
experiences of failed transition to capitalistic organization of eastern Europe and 
Russia in the 1990s through the foisting of market institutions on unprepared and 
incompatible societies (Williamson, 2000) and indeed, the prolonged period of 
political and economic turbulence in advanced Western societies since the GFC. 
Hence they are ahistorical by being selectively attentive. Further, they shift the 
burden of proof onto arguments in favour of alternatives to prove that alternatives 
are superior and worthy of consideration. In so doing, they impose their own 
market fundamentalist standards on which basis the acceptability of any 
alternative must be judged, i.e. they ‘exercise ideological hegemony over the 
boundaries of political discourse’ (Block and Somers, 2014: 184). Thus, they suffer 
from the fallacy of argumentum ad ignorantiam – merely because a more effective 
alternative cannot be proven immediately, they assume the opposite, in this case, 
the financially capitalist proposition must be true, despite obvious inherent 
contradictions.  
The reference to pre-1991 (pre-reform) India in popular discourse is representative 
of a widespread belief in the collective Indian mind, especially amongst wide 
sections of contemporary, educated middle and upper class Indians (who also 
dominate the bureaucratic, policy making, business and, increasingly, the political 
establishments), that India has never broken clear of the burdensome fetters 
originating from historic policy choices. 1991 represents a red-line in the past and 
notions of speed and flight need to be read in context – that of need for a decisive, 
permanent escape from a ‘shameful’ past and a prolonged present. Interacting 
with this belief, is the further notion that 25 years of reform, since 1991, have not 
produced desired results, putatively because the desired swift focus on wealth 
generation has been relegated due to an excessive preoccupation with 
redistribution, an argument often bordering on theoretical realism, e.g. that the 
poor need purchasing power not welfare support. This was exemplified by the 
discourse in the popular and financial media, in the run up to the 2014 general 
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elections that was overwhelmingly critical of and anathematized policy paralysis 
and governance deficit. There is now, therefore, more than ever, the widely 
articulated need for speed and flight. 
Conclusion 
In the context of discussing different bases on which theories of ideology can be 
organized, Geuss (1981: 7) analyzes rituals as non-discursive elements of religion 
(itself a component of ideology) and thereby, draws a distinction between the 
beliefs and attitudes most people in society naively associate with (a particular) 
ritual, either implicitly or explicitly through participation in the ritual and ‘the 
conflicting theological interpretations conceptually sophisticated members of the 
society give to the ritual.’ Analogously, I posit that the wider, and to a significant 
extent, manufactured discourse on Indian emergence has focused overwhelmingly 
on the coveted short-term outcomes (jobs, infrastructure, better standard of 
material life, competitive out-performance) of neoliberal policy choices that the 
path has thus far involved taking, thereby, shaping public beliefs and expectations 
amongst explicit and implicit participants with respect to their own participation 
in the ritual of emergence.  
Conversely, those having influence, providing inputs into or responsible for policy 
choices (‘the conceptually sophisticated’) are far more circumspect with respect to 
the structural adjustments and the tariff involved in emergence as a desideratum, 
almost dispassionately so. This dispassion is often a function of the 
disproportionate effects of such adjustments on the governors and the governed 
but more fundamentally reflective of the lack of space for alternative ideas and an 
inadequate critical appreciation of the zeitgeist. In either case, however, the 
discourse is overwhelmingly about methods, efficiency and narrowly instrumental 
aspects. The ideological mooring of India’s emergence at this time is remarkably 
reflective of Polanyi’s prescient characterization of the rise of the market economy 
in early nineteenth century England in the wake of the Industrial Revolution: 
Fired by an emotional faith in spontaneity, the common-sense attitude toward 
change was discarded in favour of a mystical readiness to accept the social 
consequences of economic improvement, whatever they might be…The elementary 
truths of political science and statecraft were first discredited then 
forgotten…household truths of traditional statesmanship, often merely reflecting 
the teachings of a social philosophy inherited from the ancients…(were)...erased 
from the thoughts of the educated by the corrosive of a crude utilitarianism 
combined with an uncritical reliance on the alleged self-healing virtues of 
unconscious growth. (1944/2001: 35) 
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